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ABSTRACT.  Rule of law has recently emerged as a possible solution for the 
promotion of functioning market economies and economic growth in developing 
countries.  It has been argued that an established legal system provides individuals with 
a clear understanding of the law and consequently, should be more influential on the 
behavior and decisions of those individuals.  This study explores the effects of an 
established rule of law environment on the relationship between foreign direct 
investment and economic growth. Several previous studies have analyzed the direct 
relationship between foreign investment and economic growth. However, none of these 
studies control for varying levels of legal incentives and property protection.  
Established legal institutions provide the type of stability that makes investment in a 
given country more attractive to foreign companies.  I also test whether the combination 
of rule of law and FDI affect the estimated rate of GDP growth.  The combination of 
these two effects would imply that FDI is more likely to create positive economic 
growth when applied to an economy with established legal institutions. Although the 
analysis does not fully support the effect of this rule of law–FDI interaction on growth, 
my analysis does suggest that FDI inflows are most efficient at promoting growth in 
countries with less legal development. 
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1.  Introduction 
In the richest countries it is clear that technological change, institutional innovation, 
learning by doing, and social capital, to name a few factors, are fundamental drivers of 
the economy.  
World Bank 
“Where is the World’s Wealth?”  
 
 
 
Institutions and Rule of Law 
 
For many years, economists argued that the reason for the difference in 
development levels between wealthy and poor countries was attributable to 
geographical variance in natural resources and climatic conditions.  According to this 
theory, favorable weather and location provided some countries with more resources 
and greater accessibility to markets.  These advantages are often considered to be 
responsible for pushing Europe and the United States towards the modern market 
economy and eventually, contributing to the creation of unprecedented levels of 
development.   
However, in the most recent edition of “Where is the Wealth of Nations?” Kirk 
Hamilton and other authors from the World Bank concluded that the sum of natural and 
produced capital is an insufficient means of accounting for the world’s wealth.1  In 
essence, their conclusions led them to believe that there was more to accumulated 
wealth than location and resources.  Even after adding up the value of natural resources 
and the stock of available produced capital, including equipment, structures and urban 
                                                
1 In this study, total wealth is measured as the net present value of future consumption.  The authors 
measured “total wealth by assuming a future consumption stream and calculating the net present value in 
year 2000” (Where is the Wealth of Nations, 2006, p. 23).  
Wt = ∫t∞ C(s) ⋅ e –r(s-t) , where Wt is the total wealth in year t, C(s) is consumption in year s, and r is the 
social rate of return from investments. (ibid, p. 144). 
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land, there was still a very large segment of value that was unaccounted for in their 
wealth equation.   The authors deemed this remaining value to be from a source of 
“intangible wealth,” or that value which stems from such intangible factors like “raw 
labor, human capital, social capital, and other factors such as the quality of institutions” 
(Where is the Wealth of Nations, 2006, p. 4).  In fact, they determined that the largest 
contributor to their wealth residual was a variable that was originally included to 
capture both institutional and social capital impacts – the rule of law.   In their 
regression, “a 1 percent increase in rule of law pays large dividends, boosting intangible 
capital by 0.83 percent” (ibid, p. 13). The next highest contributing factor was 
education, or human capital, with an elasticity of 0.53.  This leads the authors to 
conclude that institutional and social capital factors explain the majority of the variance 
between the amounts of intangible wealth across countries. 
If the most significant difference between the wealth of rich and poor countries 
is produced by the presence of strong institutions, we can infer that this condition must 
in some manner contribute to a heightened level of economic activity.  The question is 
how? What is it about these intangible factors that allows countries to move beyond the 
limitations imposed by natural endowments and initiate positive economic 
development?   
 
Institutions 
Trust, effective governance, law and individual rights are all part of what 
Douglass North has described as society’s institutions. Quite different from physical 
organizations, “institutions are the rules of the game in a society or, more formally, are 
the humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction.  In consequence they 
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structure incentives in human exchange, whether political, social, or economic” (North, 
1990, p. 3).   Whether they are formally constraining, like the idea of rule of law and 
individual rights, or informally constraining, such as common behavioral norms, 
institutions influence the decisions of individuals within a given society.  The idea that 
rational humans are controlled by such rules and constraints should not be controversial 
– we have in effect simply expanded the individual’s set of behavioral constraints, 
commonly defined by time and/or money, to include the influence of society’s rules on 
each individual’s set of choices.   North describes the effect of institutions best in his 
Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance: 
Institutional constraints include both what individuals are prohibited from doing 
and, sometimes, under what conditions some individuals are permitted to 
undertake certain activities.  As defined here, they therefore are the framework 
within which human interaction takes place.  They are perfectly analogous to the 
rules of the game in a competitive team sport.  That is, they consist of formal 
written rules as well as typically unwritten codes of conduct that underlie and 
supplement formal rules, such as not deliberately injuring a key player on the 
opposing team.  And as this analogy would imply, the rules and informal codes 
are sometimes violated and punishment is enacted. Therefore, an essential part of 
the functioning of institution is the costliness of ascertaining violations and the 
severity of punishment. (p. 4) 
 
North’s last comment explains that the enforcement and punishment of code violations 
is just as important as the establishment of these rules, in order for institutions to 
function effectively. If an individual can repeatedly observe unpunished violations of 
society’s supposed institutions, then they will believe that they too can violate these 
norms without cost.  That is why when there is little or no enforcement of these 
standard limitations within a society, the incentives for individuals to follow the “rules” 
disappear. Over time, arbitrary enforcement of formal institutions negates the purpose 
of establishing institutional constraints, which - under optimal conditions - is “to reduce 
uncertainty by establishing a stable (but not necessarily efficient) structure to human 
 5 
interaction” (ibid, p. 6).  Without the stability afforded by reliable enforcement, the 
positive impact on the cooperative behavior of individuals, and more collectively the 
economy, is significantly reduced. 
 
Law 
The most common measurement for understanding how well a country has 
established these institutions and consequently enforces them is defined as a rule of law, 
and it is for this reason that I have decided to use this concept to analyze the impact of 
institutional constraints on economic growth.  The idea behind a “rule of law” can be 
vague concept because of the range of ideas embodied by the term; however, Kenneth 
W. Dam enumerates the basic tenets of a rule of law as described within the existing 
literature: 
1. Legal rules should be written down and available to all residents of the 
realm: No secret law. 
2. Rules should apply, and be enforced, equally and dispassionately for all, 
regardless of position or station.  Further, the state and the ruler should also 
be subject to the law: Nobody is above the law. 
3. Individuals have a right to have rules that favor them enforced for their 
benefit.  In other words, they are entitled to access to justice on a 
nondiscriminatory basis no matter who they are and who the defendant may 
be.  (p. 16) 
 
These guidelines for understanding the rule of law concern many legal applications, 
ranging from constitutional law and the protection of individuals from the government, 
all the way down to criminal law and protecting individuals against the risk of theft and 
other everyday crimes.  Of the multitude of legal applications, a working body of 
property and contract law remains the most pertinent to the question of economic 
development. 
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Property rights are designed to give owners maximum freedom to produce or 
develop their own property as they see fit, so long as they do not impede upon this right 
for other property owners.  This freedom increases the willingness of owners to spend 
time and money investing in their property, and can produce beneficial spillover effects 
for the rest of the economy. When owners feel unsure of how well their property will be 
protected, they are unlikely to invest in the development of the property because they 
cannot accurately predict a secure rate of return on their investment and they risk losing 
a substantial amount of assets. Clague, et al. argue that “the risk of such loss is greater 
the more one specializes and the more one depends on complex exchanges,” which 
would help explain why some developing countries have been unable to make the 
transition to functioning large scale market economies (Clague, 1997, p. 69).  The 
environment is such that the level of legal incentives is insufficient to motivate 
businesses to expand and realize scale economies. Uncertainty often stems from both a 
fear of government seizure of goods or revenues, and a fear of physical destruction at 
the hands of other individuals.  The investment decision must weigh the probability of 
such occurrences against the expected rate of return, and for many investors that 
insecurity can mean the difference between building the plant that would create jobs 
and stimulate economic growth, or not.  In fact, Clague, et al. found: 
strong evidence that those underdeveloped nations respecting property… 
rights accumulate capital and increase the incomes of their populations at 
substantially higher rates than other developing countries – even when 
controlling for the large variations in starting points, in levels of schooling 
and in the price of investment goods. (p. 76). 
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Therefore, in order to encourage business and other investment opportunities, the legal 
institutions must be sufficiently protective of the rights of individual property owners 
and other investors. 
 The creation and enforcement of contract law is equally important to the 
organization of business incentives and the promotion of economic growth.  Early 
market economies were based on a simultaneous exchange of goods and payment.  In 
this environment, merchants were able to minimize the risk of losing revenues, and 
consumers could guarantee delivery of their order; it was the most secure way to 
conduct business.  A more developed and complex economy, however, requires the 
extension of credit in order to reach a larger market of consumers.  In a society where 
producers cannot confidently depend on third-party enforcement, they will limit the 
extension of credit to individuals whom they may trust through reputation or know on a 
personal basis.   However, the effective functioning of such legal  “institutions affect[s] 
the performance of the economy by their effect on the costs of exchange and 
production” (North, 1990, p. 5). If producers can confidently utilize contracts to extend 
credit to unknown individuals, then they can increase the quantity supplied to a more 
efficient level and the market can extract a higher level of both consumer and producer 
surplus. This confidence in the ability and the willingness of the government to enforce 
contracts also reduces the costs associated with ascertaining every individual’s 
creditworthiness prior to an exchange.   
In countries where we observe a lack of property rights and contract 
enforcement, whether due to a lack of formally defined law or an arbitrary enforcement 
of formally defined laws, we also expect to see a significantly lower volume of 
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complex, but potentially advantageous transactions (Clague, 1997).  Under these 
unstable conditions, individuals typically “choose to be more self-sufficient and engage 
less frequently in complex and non-self-enforcing transactions.  In the extreme, 
peasants [will] produce most of their own food rather than relying on market exchange” 
(ibid, p. 69).  Although it is rationally intuitive for individuals to pursue this self-reliant 
strategy, it has significant detrimental effects for the economy and society as a whole.  
Individual production reduces the amount of time and resources available to firms that 
would otherwise have been interested in producing on a larger scale.  As a result of this 
reduction in mass production capacity, society is forced to sacrifice potential gains from 
economies of scale, as well as domestic opportunities to invest in technological 
innovations.  Thus we find that a lack of legal institutions within a society reduces an 
individual’s incentives to engage in the open, market economy that would promote 
economic growth. 
 
FDI and Growth 
 Economists have argued over the effects of foreign direct investment  (FDI)2 on 
host countries for several decades and this debate has become increasingly important 
over time as both FDI flows and concerns about economic development increase 
simultaneously.  According to the UN Council on Trade and Development’s World 
Investment Prospects Survey for 2007-2009, more than 2/3 of respondents to the survey 
expect to increase their investment expenditures abroad, and most of these firms expect 
                                                
2 FDI is definedy by Krugman and Obstfeld as “international capital flows in which a firm in 
one country creates or expands a subsidiary in another.” (Krugman & Obstfeld, 2006, p.157). 
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to increase that value significantly.3  With worldwide FDI expenditures estimated at 
$1.3 trillion in 2006, this type investment holds at least the potential to influence 
economic development in less developed countries (UNCTAD Survey, 2007, p. 7). 
 While there are some economists who would prefer to say that FDI is more 
likely to harm developing economies, economic history has shown that this 
consequence cannot be strictly true.  The experience of East Asia and other developing 
countries in recent years has made a significant argument against the universal 
application of the dependency theory.  Economists who promote the dependency theory 
model would argue that allowing free import of foreign capital traps developing 
countries into a “neocolonial” cycle of exploitation (Farmer, 1999, p. 12).  Developing 
countries are in effect selling their cheap resources to foreign firms and then having to 
buy back more expensive finished goods.  This uneven exchange condemns poorer 
countries to a continuous cycle of selling their primary resources in order to fund 
expensive consumption.  It is this cycle that has produced the underdevelopment seen in 
many developing countries today.  In this way, “trade becomes an instrument of 
domination rather than an item of mutual benefit as characterized by the liberal 
[neoclassical] paradigm” (ibid, p. 12).   
On the other side of the argument is the neoclassical model, which would argue 
for the free flow of investment funds as dictated by market conditions.  Only by 
allowing for free movement of funds would foreign direct investment be able to 
encourage economic development by equalizing prices and incomes in developing 
                                                
3 About 30% of respondents to the survey expected to increase FDI expenditures between 10-
30% over the next three years. Another 30% of respondents expect to increase FDI more than 
30% (UNCTAD Survey, 2007, p.7, Fig. 1). 
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countries (ibid, p. 8). Regardless of whether those investment funds are market-seeking 
or resource-seeking, policy makers often anticipate FDI to:  
contribute to development through the augmentation of domestic savings and 
investment, stimulation of technology transfer, intensification of competition, 
introduction of new methods, expansion of exports and foreign exchange, 
creation of jobs, generation of tax revenue, improvement of human capital and 
access to global markets, and provision of financing, as well as through various 
other types of spillovers or positive externalities. (Dookeran, 2007, p. 123). 
 
These are all very positive spillovers that when captured correctly, are expected to 
contribute to increases in the host country’s own domestic productivity.  A study by 
Lall, Featherstone and Norman found that a 1 percent increase in foreign investment is 
associated with a 0.121% increase in pure technical efficiency.4 Although the expected 
impact is lower than if the investment funds originated domestically (0.252%), the 
positive direction of the FDI variable on efficiency supports the idea that there is the 
potential for growth from the positive spillovers associated with FDI (Lall et al., 2000, 
p. 1489). 
 
Rule of Law and FDI 
Unfortunately, the world’s experience with the long-term effects of FDI on 
economic development shows that this idealized transfer of knowledge and productivity 
does not always occur in host countries.   Studies have shown that while FDI may 
produce these growth-enhancing conditions, the extent to which FDI-led growth 
actually occurs depends significantly on country-specific characteristics to capture these 
spillover effects (Zhang, 2001).  In his research, Kevin Zhang finds that “FDI tends to 
                                                
4 Pure Technical Efficiency (PTE) measures the distance between a country’s current state of 
production and the production frontier. An increase in PTE is an efficiency gain that decreases 
the distance between current production and the frontier.  
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be more likely to promote economic growth when host countries adopt liberalized trade 
regime, improve education and thereby human capital conditions, encourage export–
oriented FDI, and maintain macroeconomic stability” (Zhang, 2001, p. 175).  These 
four conditions are important because they provide the means and incentives for 
individuals in the host country to absorb the positive externalities from contact with 
FDI.   
This absorptive condition, seen above in Zhang’s work, is especially important 
for Borensztein, et al. in their analysis of the effects of FDI on economic growth.  They 
find that while FDI has on the whole a positive effect on growth, the size of the impact 
made by FDI is closely tied to the level of human capital in the host country 
(Borensztein et al., 1998, p. 134).  The authors also argue that “the main channel 
through which FDI contributes to economic growth is by stimulating technological 
progress, rather than by increasing total capital accumulation in the host economy” 
(ibid, p. 118).  The findings that FDI has the most impact via technological progress and 
in countries where individuals are able to absorb training and technology from foreign 
owners implies that there must be a sizeable spillover effect that can be realized within 
the domestic economy as a result of FDI.    
It is through the effective capture of these spillovers that FDI will have the 
greatest impact on growth, assuming the gains are reinvested in domestic development. 
An argument frequently used against foreign direct investment is the idea that an 
abundance of foreign-based investment dollars will crowd-out domestic, indigenous 
investment.  However, Borensztein et al., when they measured FDI against total 
investment in the host country, found that their “results are supportive of a crowding-in 
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effect, that is, a one-dollar increase in the net inflow of FDI is associated with an 
increase in total investment in the host economy of more than one dollar” (ibid, p. 17-
18).  This hints that foreign investment will increase domestic investment, and we are 
assuming that rule of law would also increase the propensity for domestic investment.  
If both of these assumptions are true, then we should expect to see an additionally 
positive growth effect from the combination of FDI in a rule of law environment. 
This study analyzes the ability of a rule of law to attract FDI, as well as the 
extent to which a rule of law environment allows the host country to capture the 
positive spillovers and translate additional knowledge and income into further 
investment and ultimately, growth.  
 
 
 
 
2. Methodology 
 
The purpose of this study is to analyze the relationship between FDI and 
economic growth while controlling for the level of developed legal incentives within each 
respective country. I employ a two-equation model in order to address the complex 
relationship between the rule of law, FDI and growth.  The idea to develop a two-
equation model was influenced primarily by Simeon Hein’s efforts to analyze how the 
trade policy adopted by a country affects the impact of FDI on economic growth.  He 
addresses two questions, namely “whether nations’ policies affect the amount of foreign 
investment they receive,” and whether or not “foreign investment [has] uniform and 
predictable effects on developing economies” (Hein, 1992, p. 507).  Although Hein’s 
research is aimed at understanding the impact of a closed versus open liberal trade policy 
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on the FDI-growth relationship, it was a theoretical starting point for research related to 
the impact of government action on this relationship. The model employed in this study 
will look more toward the role of government as a legal institution-creating body to 
generate incentives for both foreign and domestic investors.  As a result, I will be able to 
investigate whether a rule of law environment influences the potential for growth from 
FDI.   
Similarly influential was Burnside and Dollar’s 2000 study, “Aid, Policies, and 
Growth.”  Their work sought to understand in an explicitly specified empirical model the 
relationship between foreign aid and economic growth, while accounting for differences 
in governance.  Like FDI, foreign aid is sometimes thought to be beneficial for the 
purpose of stimulating economic growth in developing countries.  Burnside and Dollar 
look at whether the government’s role of maintaining economic stability influences the 
distribution of aid dollars, as well as the ability of aid dollars to promote growth.  They 
ultimately want to see whether aid adds an additional boost to growth when applied in an 
environment of good governance.  The use of both of these equations is important for 
analyzing to what extent governance affects aid, or in the case of this study, law affects 
FDI.  It is entirely possible that in this model a rule of law environment does attract 
additional FDI without necessarily affecting the ability of each FDI dollar to influence 
growth.  Thus, measuring both of these relationships allows us to understand how we can 
influence growth by means of FDI. 
The first equation in the model regresses FDI on various economic and social 
conditions found in the host country that would tend to make that specific market more 
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attractive to foreign investors. This equation tests whether or not rule of law is a 
significant motivation for investors to direct investment dollars into the market. 
 
 
 
                                        FDIit =  α  + β1yit + β2ROL +  β3Trade + ui + ε it                                     (1) 
 
 
 
where,  FDIit = Net FDI inflows as a percentage of GDP. 
yit = log of real per capita GDP at beginning of period 
ROL = measure of Rule of Law 
Trade = (Exports + Imports)/GDP 
ui = fixed-effects error term 
εit = zero-mean scalar error term 
 
 
In accordance with the Burnside and Dollar model, I have utilized the log of real 
per capita GDP at the beginning of the period as a measure of initial income. In terms of 
attracting FDI, the expectation is that log of initial income will capture diminishing 
expectations for the amount of FDI a country can attract as it approaches its Solow-model 
steady state.    
The rule of law (ROL) measure used in equation (1) is the variable of most 
interest to this study.  As defined by the World Bank’s Governance Indicators report, the 
rule of law measures “the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the 
rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, the police, and the 
courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence” (Kaufmann, et al., 2007, p. 4).  
This indicator is in essence an understanding of how fairly and predictably rules are 
created and enforced. The specification of this variable in the model will allow the 
regression to estimate the effect of a rule of law environment on investors’ decision to 
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invest in country i.  I expect this variable to produce a positive effect on investors’ 
motivations. 
I was motivated to include a trade openness variable after reading the research of 
Hein and others.5  Hein’s research focused on analyzing the relative importance of a 
country’s stated trade policy in determining the flow of foreign investment funds.  He 
recognized that if country i is relatively open to trade, it would be easier for foreign firms 
to invest there and so FDI flows should be relatively higher, other things equal.  The 
opposite can also be said for an economy that has followed a policy aimed at limiting 
international trade.  Consequently, I consider trade openness to be an important 
determinant of expected FDI flows.   
 
The second regression equation in the model estimates the relationship between 
FDI and growth while controlling for varying levels of legal institutions, and other 
conditions for growth as described in the Solow growth model.  This will allow us to 
measure the effect of a rule of law environment on the ability of FDI to affect the rate of 
growth in the economy of country i. 
 
 
Git = α  + β1yit + β2FDI + β3ROL + β4FDI*ROL +  β5SSER + ui + ε it                      (2) 
 
 
where,  Git = rate of growth of GDP (nominal dollars) 
yit = log of real per capita GDP at beginning of period 
FDI = Net FDI Inflows as % GDP 
ROL = measure of Rule of Law 
SSER = rate of secondary school enrollment of eligible aged children 
ui = fixed-effects error term 
εit = zero-mean scalar error term 
                                                
5 See Davidson (1980), and de Mello, Jr. (1999)  
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 The log of initial income is included in this regression as well as (1) in order to 
capture the expected growth pattern that emerges from convergence as dictated by the 
Solow growth model. The Solow growth model expects that income in a given country 
will ultimately approach its own unique steady state.  Based on this principle, we should 
expect to see similar steady states across two countries if the savings rate, population 
growth rates, and rate of technological progress are the same.  In the case when two 
countries are expected to converge to the same steady state, the model predicts that we 
will observe faster growth in poorer countries as they accelerate to converge with the 
more developed country.  In order for the less capital abundant country to catch up to its 
more advanced steady state partner, it must grow at a faster rate. In the case in which 
the conditions stated above are not the same across countries, each country will 
converge to its own unique steady state.  This is known as conditional convergence. 
This is why is important to allow the model to reflect different growth rates based on 
country i's proximity to it own unique steady state. 
 In this regression (2), it was essential to include a measure of FDI flows to 
country i.  FDI here is measured as a percentage of GDP to control for differences in 
market size.  By including this variable, we will be able to observe the expected change 
in growth as a result of changes in FDI flows.  Similarly important is the rule of law 
variable, as expressed in regression (1).  However, only by interacting the two variables 
– rule of law and FDI – will we really be able to address the fact that FDI may have a 
different effect for countries that have experienced diverse legal environments. 
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Burnside and Dollar also utilized this technique in their research; they include both aid 
and governance individually, as well as interacted. 
 Although this study is not specifically focused on the relationship between 
education and economic growth, there is general consensus in the literature that 
education is an important condition for economic growth.  Because of this, it is 
important to include secondary school enrollment rates in equation (2) so that we may 
control for different levels of education across countries.  Education is an extremely 
hard concept to quantify and judge because the reported quality can differ so greatly 
across countries.  For this reason, I have decided to utilize a measure of education based 
on the percent of children of eligible age who attend secondary school.  There is no 
explicit judgment about quality in this measure, but I will assume that in countries 
where the level of children attending school is high, the country has made education a 
priority, at least to some degree, and so the quality should also be greater.  Therefore, I 
expect to see that the higher the percentage of eligible children enrolled in school, the 
greater their expected ability to capture the knowledge spillover effects from FDI, and 
eventually, promote growth. 
 
 
3. Data and Statistical Issues 
 
Data 
In order to study the impact of rule of law and FDI on economic growth, I 
collected data on the variables that I deemed would most influence FDI allocation and 
the rate of growth.  The dataset for this study was compiled primarily from the World 
Bank’s “World Development Indicators” database, with the exception of the rule of law 
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data. Compiling the supporting data from the singular World Bank database should 
provide some consistency in collection and measurement criteria across the different 
variables. The collection of this data was limited by the availability of the rule of law 
data, which constrained the span of the present study to ten years in length.  Exact 
variable definitions are available in the appendix.  
The rule of law data were collected from the 2006 World Governance Indicators 
(WGI) study, which was completed by Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi from the World 
Bank.  The study provides an indicator figure, a measure of the margin of error, and a 
percentile rank.  For this study, I utilized the basic indicator, which runs on a continuous 
scale from -2.5 to 2.5, so as to best capture changes both within and between countries 
over the ten-year time span.  The governance scores are normally distributed around a 
zero mean, which allows us to use the measurements in the dataset as they are presented 
by the WGI study.  
The WGI study is innovative in its decision to synthesize data from multiple 
sources about the condition of the various aspects of governance.  Survey data are 
frequently subject to measurement error based on the perspective of the source. 
However, the series of WGI studies attempts to balance this error by collecting data 
from several different perspectives.  The governance indicators are derived from 
sources including “public sector, private sector and NGO experts, as well as thousands 
of citizen and firm respondents” (Kaufmann et al., 2007, abstract).    The authors 
ultimately found that their use of several sources was beneficial to the quality of 
indicators produced.  They conclude that their research has been so successful “that 
even after taking margins of error into account, the WGI permit meaningful cross-
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country comparisons as well as monitoring [individual] progress over time” (ibid, 
abstract).   
Despite the achievements of this study, the dataset still has its limitations. Since 
the compilation of data on governance across countries is necessarily subject to 
measurement error, we cannot take the governance ratings as a perfect indicator of the 
environment.   This is why Kaufmann, et al. include the margin of error in their 
findings.  They suggest that for cross-country comparisons, “when confidence intervals 
for governance based on our reported margins of error overlap in comparisons … this 
suggests that the data do not reveal statistically (or for that matter practically) 
significant differences” (ibid, p. 1).  These ratings have improved and the margins of 
error have declined as the study has aged, due primarily to an increase in the number of 
data sources and the standardization of sources over time. For simplification in this 
study, I have assumed that the reported indicators are a sufficiently close estimate, and 
therefore have not included the measure of the margin of error into my calculations. 
The goal at the outset of my study was to include as many countries from around 
the world in the dataset.  Therefore, the original sample of countries included all 212 
states included in the WGI dataset.  However, countries had to be eliminated based on 
the availability of data, or lack thereof. Several countries were deleted from my dataset 
because numbers were unavailable from the World Bank dataset for one or more 
variable.  Although this elimination was necessary to streamline the dataset, it also 
tended to erase potentially interesting observations from our consideration, including 
Afghanistan, Cuba, North Korea, Iraq, and Somalia. Given their reputations for unstable 
domestic conditions, it would have been very interesting to be able to analyze the 
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impact of legal institutions on the rate of economic growth in these particular countries.  
However, it is very likely that FDI flows to these countries are too low to be of 
consequential use for this model.  A complete list of all 156 countries utilized in the 
study can be found in the appendix (Table 2). 
 
 
Statistical Issues 
Growth is a long-run phenomenon that we can really only begin to see 
perspective on over a long period of time.  To illustrate, Burnside and Dollar’s study 
utilized data from twenty-four years.  They divided the period into six subsets, each 
being four years in length. Unfortunately, the availability of rule of law data, as an 
integral part of this study, limits us to a ten-year period (1996-2006).  In order to best 
approximate this subset method in the shortened time frame, I split the ten years into 
three periods, 1996-2000, 2000-2003, and 2003-2006. The growth data have been 
annualized over these three periods and recorded as an observation for the first year of 
the subset.6 While this is a fairly reasonable approximation, we may ultimately have to 
acknowledge that the data are too short on perspective to provide us with definitive 
answers.  As more data become available in the World Governance Indicators database, 
it would be interesting to revisit this model and reassess the regressions.  
As a panel data model where these two equations vary over both time t and 
country i, the dynamic of the error term must be analyzed and fitted into the model. 
Given that our time frame for this study is a relatively small set of ten years, many of 
the sources of heterogeneity between countries will remain constant over that time span.  
For example, social factors like health and education can influence growth via 
                                                
6 Git = ( (GDPt+j/GDPt)(1/j) - 1)*100 . For the first period, 1996-2000, j=4.  For the other two periods, 
2000-2003 and 2003-2006, j=3. 
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productivity and investment in country i.  Unfortunately, such social factors are also 
quite unlikely to change in any significant manner over the course of ten years.  
Therefore, any unobserved factors that are incorporated in the error term, we will 
assume are constant over time within a particular country i. The presence of such 
unobserved sources of heterogeneity do not pose econometric issues on their own, but 
can create biases when these unobserved factors are correlated to other independent 
variables.   
In this study there does exist a significant positive correlation between such 
social factors related to growth and the independent variable, log of initial income. For 
example, despite a limited amount of available data, we do know that there exists a 
correlation of about 0.81 between the log of initial income and secondary school 
enrollment rates. This would tend to indicate that as income increases, countries tend to 
exhibit higher standards of education.  Similar intuition follows as well for other social 
factors not explicitly specified in this study, including the example of health and health 
care used above.  Ultimately, the education variable SSER was removed from the 
growth function for reasons discussed later.  Therefore, any explanatory power from the 
education variable is now contained in the error term.  Since we know that there tends 
to be this correlation between initial income and social factors, a fixed-effects model 
would most accurately capture any bias created by these unspecified sources of 
heterogeneity.   
In the early stages of this study, I had originally intended to include two dummy 
variables to account for geographical regional variance in both FDI receipts and growth.  
The two dummies - DEA for East Asia, and DSSA for Sub-Saharan Africa – were meant to 
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capture the different experiences of these two regions.  For example, Sub-Saharan Africa 
has historically received a very small percentage of the FDI made available each year.  
According to the UNCTAD survey, the prospects of Sub-Saharan Africa remain low in 
terms of expected FDI flows; it ranked lowest in investment preferences for 2006 and is 
expected to remain in that position through 2009.7  Unique in the opposite direction is the 
experience of East Asia, which is expected to remain on top of the list of prospective 
foreign investment locations through 2009.   
Unfortunately, the fixed effects model prohibits us from utilizing the dummy 
variables for the two geographic regions since it is possible to create a linear combination 
of the dummies for geography and the fixed effect such that there no longer exists a 
unique solution. This was seemingly problematic given that previous theory and evidence 
seem to point at the importance of isolating the impact of these two regions.  East Asia 
and Sub-Saharan Africa consistently rank at the top and bottom, respectively, for FDI 
receipts, and to a lesser degree, growth.  However, when either dependent variable is 
expressed as a function of East Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa only, the resultant F-statistic 
supports the exclusion of the geographic dummies.8  With F-statistics below the critical 
value of 3.019, we can conclude that there is not a statistically significant relationship 
between the set of dummy variables and the dependent variable, FDI allocation or 
growth, respectively. 
 
                                                
7 See Figure 8. “Investment preferences by host region, 2006 and 2007–2009” (UNCTAD survey, 2007, 
p. 24). 
8 F-statistics were determined using OLS regressions for both functions.  When FDI receipts is regressed 
as a function of the two dummy variables, the F-statistic equals 0.04. When GDP growth is regressed, the 
F-stat equals 0.46. 
9 The critical value was determined given p=2 numerator degrees of freedom and n-p-1=472 denominator 
degrees of freedom. Fα = 3.01. 
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4. Empirical Work 
 
FDI Allocation 
 
According to the STATA-derived fixed effects estimation, FDI is a positive 
function of our variables for rule of law and trade (Table 3).  In accordance with 
expectations, an increase in either of these two independent variables will increase the 
amount of FDI allocated to country i.  Specifically, a one percentage-point increase in 
the ratio of trade to GDP, other things equal, will increase the FDI to GDP ratio by 0.09 
percentage points.  Similarly, a one-unit change in the rule of law indicator will increase 
the FDI ratio by 1.076 percentage points.  However, since this rule of law indicator runs 
on a relatively small five-point scale, the potential for change is relatively limited in 
comparison to the other variables.   With a t-statistic of 1.08, the rule of law variable is 
not even marginally significant at the 10% level. The absence of statistical significance 
here may be a direct consequence of the limited dataset.  While we cannot be 
completely confident of the size of the influence that rule of law has on FDI receipts, 
the probability is relatively high that the relationship is positive.10 All the remaining 
variables in the function are significant at the 5% level, so we can be more confident in 
the accuracy of those estimators.  
The R2 indicates that this functional expression explains about 12% of the 
variation between observations within a country i.  Conversely, this expression only 
explains about 7.5% of the variation observed between countries.  This discrepancy 
indicates that factors like legal institutions and openness to trade are more significant 
for understanding changes in FDI receipts over time within a country, than between 
                                                
10 The 95% confidence interval for the rule of law variable is [-0.8853841, 3.03797]. 
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multiple locations.  If this is the case, then other factors must be more significant for 
when firms are deciding between different locations. Davidson’s work, “The Location 
of Foreign Direct Investment Activity,” supports this last notion by arguing that cultural 
similarity, regional experience and geographic proximity are the most significant 
determinants of the location of FDI.  I did not include such measures due to the 
difficulty of calculating these measures for use in a general model, but their exclusion 
would explain some of the disparity between the two values for R2. Regardless, the 
model for FDI allocation as specified exhibits a marginally positive relationship 
between rule of law and FDI receipts, even if this relationship is more relevant within a 
given country than between countries.   
 
 
GDP Growth 
 
The results of the fixed effects growth regression illustrate that GDP growth is a 
positive function of FDI receipts and rule of law (Table 4).  While the coefficients on 
these two variables turned out in accordance with expectations, the coefficient on the 
variable of most interest to this study did not.  The purpose of the GDP growth function 
was to analyze the additional impact that FDI inflows might have on growth if rule of 
law was adjusted.  The regression presents a negative effect from this interaction term, 
which is contrary to what was expected.  The partial derivative indicates that in level-
form a one percentage-point increase in the FDI ratio will change GDP growth by 0.132 
– 0.109rol.11  This derivative is a decreasing function, indicating that the effect on 
growth must at some point hit the zero-level and in turn, become negative.  That critical 
                                                
11 ∂GDP growth/∂FDI = 0.132 – 0.109rol.  
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point is when rule of law equals 1.2.12  If the rule of law indicator is estimated at below 
1.2, then an increase in FDI flows would accelerate GDP growth.  If rule of law is 
above 1.2, then any increases in FDI flows will decelerate GDP growth. Perhaps this 
critical value of 1.2 implies a maximization in the efficiency of a rule of law. In this 
study the rule of law has been captured as a linear function, but it is possible that it does 
not behavior linearly.  This misspecification maybe why the regression results found the 
rule of law variable to be only minimally significant in all specifications of the growth 
equation.   
Another possible explanation for the negative interaction variable is that the 
regression results are true.  The rule of law variable as described in this study, is really a 
measure of the expected fairness in a legal institution. The underlying data ask whether 
rules are made, and whether they are followed through on.  While we would all like to 
believe the best solution should be a maximization of said fairness, perhaps too much 
fairness disables the capacity of domestic individuals to capture the spillovers from FDI 
and translate them into domestic investment and growth.  Foreign investors may be 
legally protected to the point where they are able to extract for themselves the entire 
benefit from their investment.  As a result, there would be no spillovers available for the 
local individuals to capture.13 If the maximization of legal fairness reduces the 
availability of spillover to domestic agents, then there is a real possibility that rule of 
law reduces the GDP growth potential from foreign investment.  However, I believe 
                                                
12 The critical value for rule of law is found by setting the partial derivative equal to zero and solving for 
rol. 
13 The debate over ideal patent length in the realm of intellectual property law is akin to this notion. 
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that both the scope and level of sophistication in this study need to be developed before 
such concrete conclusions can be drawn.   
The R2 values indicate that about 5% of the variation observed within a given 
country can be explained by the growth regression used above, and about 27% of the 
variation between countries.   From this we can understand that rule of law and FDI 
inflows explain more of the growth variation between countries than within a single 
country over time.  This result would seem to support Zhang’s work on the importance 
of country-specific characteristics.  FDI and rule of law can explain about a quarter of 
the cross-country variation.  However, other variables are more relevant to 
understanding growth within one country.  Many such characteristics were not specified 
in this general model, and I may have excluded those characteristics that help countries 
capture the spillover effects from FDI most efficiently.   
As a note, my original growth specification included a variable measuring 
secondary school enrollment rates as a way to control for differing levels of human 
capital.  Human capital is often discussed as a country-specific variable that helps 
determine whether or not a country will be able to benefit from FDI spillovers. 
However, upon completing the regression analysis, it became clear that the scarcity of 
data for the SSER variable was an issue for producing statistically significant results.  
We lose data on 35 countries as a result of including the SSER variable in the growth 
specification.  Without the data from these countries, our results are noticeably 
weakened.  For example, the overall R2 value rises from 0.0000 to 0.1797 by removing 
the SSER variable.  Unfortunately, the education variable is very statistically significant 
in every specification of the growth regression.  While considering the decision to drop 
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SSER, all of the statistics illustrate that the additional data observations make a positive 
difference.  By dropping the SSER variable, the standard error on all other variables 
decreased and the explanatory power of the growth regression as a whole increased 
significantly. Had the availability of education data been more comprehensive, the 
SSER variable would have probably contributed positively to the results.14 Instead, I 
dropped the variable, and assume that by dropping it, the marginal effect of human 
capital on GDP growth is captured in the fixed effects error term.  This is reasonable 
given that school enrollment rates as a source of heterogeneity are not likely to change 
much over the 10-year time frame. Consequently, the regression results are significantly 
strengthened and all but one variable become statistically significant at the 5% level 
(Table 4).   
  
 
5. Conclusions 
This study, while it may not have produced the exact results I was expected 
based upon my research, did produce some other interesting conclusions.  First being 
that rule of law, or the expectation of legal fairness, does affect the decisions of firms 
investing abroad.  I found that there was a positive, although not statistically significant 
estimate for the effect of ROL on FDI allocation. By utilizing the fixed-effects model, 
we were able to see that this rule of law may be more influential for firms as they 
increase or decrease their foreign investment within a given country, than for a firm 
looking to invest in one of several countries.  In the latter situation, other factors like 
                                                
14 Specification #3 has an R2 for within a single country equal to 0.1238.  The SSER variable is most 
likely responsible for the comparative increase between #4 and #3 of the explanatory power of the growth 
regression within countries. See Table 4. 
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cultural similarity, geographical proximity and other costs may play a greater role in the 
ultimate decision (Davidson).   
Second, by looking at the interaction of ROL and FDI in the growth function, 
we saw that there was a negative and statistically significant result.  While it is entirely 
possible that the results are capturing the actual relationship between these two factors, I 
believe that there maybe some misspecification error.  This misspecification maybe in 
the statistics, or it may be in the data itself.  It is possible that there is a different 
indicator or measure that more accurately describes the legal incentives for investing 
firms.  I would like to see this study expanded on with regards to time and 
specifications, so as to resolve this issue.  It would also be interesting to see how the 
results change as data from additional years are added to the WGI study database.  
As these results stand now, however, we can begin to make implications for 
policy.  The positive relationship between ROL and FDI allocation means that countries 
looking to increase their share of such investment should be working to increase and 
enforce lawfulness.  International aid directed at reworking legal institutions, if 
successful, should attract additional foreign investment.  We also saw that FDI is 
expected to increase GDP growth rates when ROL is below the critical value of 1.2.  It 
would then appear reasonable to increase foreign investment as a way to promote 
economic growth in developing countries, as these are typically the countries with 
lower levels of developed legal institutions.  
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Appendix 
 
Table 1 
_________________________________________________________________ 
Variable Description Source 
Annualized GDP Growth GDP growth annualized 
over three periods, 1996-
2000, 2000-2003 and 2003-
2006 
World Bank, World 
Development Indicators 
Per Capita PPP GDP per capita converted 
using PPP rates. Data in 
constant 2000 international 
$. 
World Bank, World 
Development Indicators 
Foreign Direct Investment Net inflows, measured as  
% of GDP 
World Bank, World 
Development Indicators 
Trade Sum of exports and 
imported goods and 
services, measured as % of 
GDP 
World Bank, World 
Development Indicators 
Secondary School 
Enrollment Rate 
Ratio of children at official 
school age enrolled in 
secondary school to 
number of official school 
age children in population 
World Bank, World 
Development Indicators 
Rule of Law Extent to which agents 
have confidence in and 
abide by the rules of 
society (-2.5:2.5 scale) 
Kaufmann, Kraay, 
Mastruzzi, World 
Governance Indicators 
(2006) 
East Asia Dummy   
Sub-Saharan Africa 
Dummy 
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Appendix 
 
Table 2 
Albania Egypt, Arab Rep. Lesotho^ Spain 
Algeria El Salvador Lithuania Sri Lanka 
Angola^ Equatorial Guinea^ Macedonia, FYR St. Kitts and Nevis 
Argentina Eritrea^ Madagascar^ St. Lucia 
Armenia Estonia Malawi^ St. Vincent and the Grenadines 
Australia Ethiopia^ Malaysia* Sudan^ 
Austria Fiji* Mali^ Swaziland^ 
Azerbaijan Finland Mauritania^ Sweden 
Bangladesh France Mauritius^ Switzerland 
Belarus Gabon^ Mexico Syrian Arab Republic 
Belgium Gambia, The^ Moldova Tajikistan 
Belize Georgia Mongolia* Tanzania^ 
Benin^ Germany Morocco Thailand 
Bhutan Ghana^ Mozambique^ Togo^ 
Bolivia Greece Nepal Tonga* 
Botswana^ Grenada Netherlands Trinidad and Tobago 
Brazil Guatemala New Zealand Tunisia 
Bulgaria Guinea^ Nicaragua Turkey 
Burkina Faso^ Guinea-Bissau^ Niger^ Uganda^ 
Burundi^ Guyana Nigeria^ Ukraine 
Cambodia* Haiti Norway United Kingdom 
Cameroon^ Honduras Oman United States 
Canada Hong Kong, China* Pakistan Uruguay 
Cape Verde^ Hungary Panama Uzbekistan 
Central African Republic^ Iceland Papua New Guinea* Vanuatu* 
Chad^ India Paraguay Venezuela, RB 
Chile Indonesia* Peru Vietnam* 
China* Iran, Islamic Rep. Philippines* Yemen, Rep. 
Colombia Ireland Poland Zambia^ 
Comoros^ Israel Portugal Zimbabwe^ 
Congo, Dem. Rep.^ Italy Romania  
Congo, Rep.^ Jamaica Russian Federation 
Costa Rica Japan Rwanda^  
Cote d'Ivoire^ Jordan Samoa*  
Croatia Kazakhstan Senegal^  
Cyprus Kenya^ Seychelles^  
Czech Republic Korea, Rep.* Sierra Leone^  
Denmark Kuwait Singapore*  
Djibouti Kyrgyz Republic Slovak Republic  
Dominica Lao PDR* Slovenia  
Dominican Republic Latvia Solomon Islands  
Ecuador Lebanon South Africa^  
 
* East Asia 
^ Sub-Saharan Africa 
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Appendix 
Table 3 
 
 
 
Regression Estimates 
(Estimated Standard Error in Parentheses) 
Dependent Variable: FDI 
 
 
                       Fixed Effects Regression 
    Variable                                                          Estimated Coefficient      
                   (Standard Error)                     
 
    Specification #1a  Specification #2   
 
Intercept    31.78243**  32.74263** 
    (11.24101)  (111.27304) 
 
Log of Initial Income  -4.169735**  -4.276994** 
    (1.340296)  (1.343603) 
 
Rule of Law (ROL)        -   1.076293 
       (0.9968229) 
  
Trade    0.0893072**   0.0896648** 
    (0.0153268)  (0.0153262) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Number of Observations  457   457 
Number of Groups   155   155 
R2    0.0541   0.0674 
     within    0.1190   0.1224 
     between   0.0597   0.0748 
  
 
 
 
 
a. Specification #1 excludes Rule of Law variable 
 
** Statistically significant at the 5% level. 
 
 34 
Appendix 
Table 4 
 
 
Regression Estimates 
(Estimated Standard Error in Parentheses) 
Dependent Variable: GDP Growth 
 
 
             Fixed Effects Regression                    
    Variable                                                                                   Estimated Coefficient                    
                                                  (Standard Error)                      
 
    Specification #1a Specification #2b     Specification #3     Specification 
#4c 
 
Intercept    -15.29068 -17.22211      -11.78542      13.31163 
    (12.65654) (12.73317)     (12.65029)      (10.03972) 
 
Log of Initial Income  0.8178933 1.086167          0.3257639      -1.142421 
    (1.570738) (1.579893)     (1.1573976)      (1.187432) 
 
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) 0.0816798*        -      0.1228245**      0.1317737** 
    (0.050679)              (0.0527605)      (0.0474955) 
 
Rule of Law (ROL)         -  -0.2403315     0.2939265      0.426406 
      (0.9035675)     (0.917873)      (0.8552972) 
 
FDI*ROL          -         -      -0.112839**      -0.1085036** 
            (0.045352)      (0.0399695) 
 
Secondary School Enrollment (SSER) 0.1945233** 0.194618 **     0.2037064**              - 
    (0.0525651) (0.0529448)     (0.052203) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Number of Observations  321  321      321        465 
Number of Groups   120  120      120        155 
R2    0.0027  0.0049      0.0000             0.1797 
     Within   0.0957  0.0842      0.1238        0.0570 
     Between   0.0087  0.0132      0.0006        0.2708 
 
 
 
a. Specification #1 excludes Rule of Law variable 
b. Specification #2 excludes FDI variable 
c. Specification #4 excludes SSER variable 
 
*Statistically significant at the 10% level. 
**Statistically significant at the 5% level. 
